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O. Introduction 
Most linguists, in studying language change, have long assumed that 
there are changes which might well be described as being simultaneous, in 
that one change, Dx, occurs at the same time as another change, 0¥. In 
addition, it has also been assumed that there are changes which might be 
termed automatic, in that one change, Dx, necessarily· causes another 
change, Dy. In actuality, though, since the exact timing of changes is 
often hara to determine, it is generally the case that changes are 
counted as simultaneous if they at least appear to occur in close 
succession. 
It should be clear that not all simultaneous changes are linked in 
the causal relationship implied by the label "automatic". In particular, 
two changes--for example a change in the articulation of some sound and a 
reanalysis of a syntactic construction--may have nothing to do with one 
another yet may just happen to occur (virtually) at the same stage in a 
language's development. More often, probably, two changes that are 
simultaneous--or nearly so, to be more accurate--do stand in a 
cause-effect relationship, so that one change can be taken fa be a 
consequence of the other change. Even in such cases, though, there need 
not be any notion of necessity in the actuation of the second change, 
i.e. one does not have to be an automatic consequence of the other. Two 
examples from historical phonology demonstrate this difference well. 
Martinet, in several works (e.g. Martinet 1953), has argued for the 
·existence of so-called "drag-chains" in sound change, in which one sound 
shift leaves a gap in a system but "drags" another sound along with it to 
fill that gap. For example, under one possible interpretation of the 
Grimm's Law consonant shift in pre-Germanic, the shift of the 
Proto-Inda-European voiceless unaspirated stops, e.g. *t, to voiceless 
fricatives, e.g. *9, left a gap in the consonant system that was then 
filled by the Inda-European voiced unaspirated stops shifting to 
voiceless unaspirated stops, e.g. *d ---> *t. In such an account, the *t 
---> *9 change dragged along the *d ---> *t change. While Martinet has 
in general viewed such a second shift as a necessary consequence of the 
first, in actuality, sound systems tolerate many gaps happily, so the 
creation of such an imbalance in a system does not automatically occasion 
the filling of that gap through another sound shift. In such a case, 
then, two (virtually) simultaneous changes need not be causally linked. 
An example of an automatic change, though, is provided by the 
restructuring of underlying lexical representations brought on by 
unconditioned sound changes. For instance, when Inda-European *d became 
Germanic *t, lexical forms which had had *d were restructured so as to 
reflect the new pronunciation, as in the change of the word for 'ten': 
/*dek'm/ ---> /*texum/ (cf. Gothic taihun, English ten, etc., and note 
that there were other changes as well not relevant here). At the point 
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·at which *d became *t, there was no longer any support for underlying /d/ 
either from morphophonemic alternations or even distributional evidence, 
so the lexical form--under any set of theoretical assumptions about how 
such forms are established by speakers learning their language--would 
have to change when *d changed. Thus the restructuring would have been 
(virtually) simultaneous with the sound change and an automatic 
consequence of it. 
This restructuring is an example of an automatic change from the 
realm· of phonological change, but examples of automatic and simultaneous 
changes have been proposed for syntactic change as well. However, the 
cases that have been proposed for automatic and simultaneous syntactic 
changes are not without some problems. Accordingly, a brief review of 
some of these attempts at uncovering this type of syntactic change is 
undertaken here, and then two case-studies are presented from the history 
of Greek which provide stronger and more convincing instances of 
automatic syntactic chan·ges. 
It is important to point out, though, that it is very·hard to prove 
conclusively that two changes are automatic or even that they are 
simultaneous; this is a recurring problem in the evaluation of such 
examples. However, where one can find either no evidence to the contrary 
or else positive indications that the two changes were not separated by 
long periods of time, it can be assumed that two changes which appear to 
be (virtually) simultaneous in fact are. to be classified as such, for 
that assumption allows for the possibility of interesting claims 
regarding the nature of syntactic change. 
Without the assumption of some kind of interaction between or among 
various changes, diachronic syntax becomes little more than a taxonomy of 
what changed between stage X and stage Y of a language; few,· if any, 
interesting generalizations become possible about a theory of syntactic 
change, providing, for example, a delimitation of the range of possible 
changes in the syntax of a language. Therefore, wherever possible, the 
strongest position to take is that two apparently simultaneous changes 
are in fact simultaneous, for one can then work from there to try to find 
an explanation for this simultaneity. Accounting for one change in terms 
of another, by showing one to be an automatic consequence of the other, 
would be one way of providing such an explanation.I 
Furthermore, such explanations for syntactic changes, when 
available, can be used as a way of constructing arguments for or against 
particular theoretical stances, under the assumption that a synchronic 
theory provides the constraints on possible changes a language may 
undergo.2 Such a position has been taken, for example, by Lightfoot 
(1979a). He contends that Linguistic Theory should interact with a 
theory of change to pinpoint when grammars would undergo drastic 
reanalyses, One can further claim, following the line of argumentation 
being developed here, that a theory's ability to characterize one of two 
apparently simultaneous changes as being in fact an automatic change, a 
necessary consequence of and thus explained in terms of the other, should 
likewise count as an important criterion upon which to judge competing 
theories of grammar. 
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In particular, in the examination of the putative automatic changes 
from the hi~tory of Greek, an argument is developed against a· 
derivational framework for a theory of syntax and in favor .of a 
nonderivational approach. Briefly, a derivational theory of syntax is 
one in which rules apply in a certain order to. produce a·series of 
intermediate stages that convert a deep structure of a given sentence 
into a particular surface structure--the series of stages formed by the 
output of rule applications is called a derivation. 3 In a nonderivatinal 
framework, by contrast, there is basically no difference between deep 
structures and surface structures and thus one is not converted into the 
other via a series of intermediate steps; instead, some notion such as 
the designation of levels at which syntactic generalizations can be 
stated (e.g. initial syntactic level, final syntactic level, some 
combination, etc.)--as in current versions of Relational Grammar and 
Arc-Pair Grammar4--or some division of labor into components--e.g. 
semantic as opposed to syntactic, as in Generalized Phrase Structure 
Grammar with its rule-to-rule semantics--is employed. The analogue to a 
derivational theory's step-by-step rules in a nonderivational theory is a 
set of well-formedness conditions holding on .surface forms, where 
elements can appear, in what combinations, how they relate to other 
elements in the sentence, and so forth. In such a system, the notion of 
derivation has no place. 
Although comparing frameworks is a very tricky business, and 
perhaps not even possible, because the ground rules can .be so very 
different in different frameworks, the two general approaches to syntax 
outlined here differ in one respect in the way they account for a 
particular change in Greek to be presented below. This distinction is 
discussed again in connection with that change after a look at some 
instances of automatic syntactic change that have been proposed in the 
literature. 
1. Some Previous Attempts at Finding Automatic Syntactic Changes 
Among the instances cited as examples of automatic syntactic change 
(though not necessarily labelled as such) are the following two provided 
by Lightfoot in various studies. 
Lightfoot (1974, 1976, 1979a) has argued that a number of 
(nearly/virtually) simultaneous changes in the verbs which are now the 
Modern English modals (Q!!!!, could,~. etc.) were the automatic 
consequences of a single innovative restructuring of the base rules in 
16th century English. He claims that Old English and Middle English 
predecessors to the modals were real verbs, no different in any respect 
from other complement-taking verbs such as .t!:l'. or want, but that for a 
variety of reasons, they lost some verb-like features, e.g. no longer 
having full person and number paradigms, and were reanalyzed as forming a 
class distinct from that of .t!:l'. or want. 
Thus, from a set of phrase structure rules as (la) for Old and 
Middle English (which alternatively could have had the form in (lb)): 
1. a. OE/ME: s ---> NP AUX VP 
AUX ---> T(ense) 
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b. 	 s ---> NP VP  
VP---> V + T (NP ... )  
Lightfoot claims that 16th century English innovated a new expansion for 
AUX, creating a new deep structure category of medals(= M), and giving 
the 	rules in (2): 
2. 	 s ---> NP AUX VP 
AUX---> 	 T (M)  
M ---> can, !!!J!l'., ••••  
Furthermore, he claims that this new phrase structure rule, this single 
innovation, triggered the four changes listed below in (3) as automatic 
consequences: 
3. 	 a. no 'more infinitival forms of medals 
b. no more gerund (-ing) forms of medals 
c. only one modal per (simplex) sentence (in standard language) 
d. no more have+ MODAL+~ combinations. 
The absence of infinitival forms, for example, follows necessarily 
because the new modal class.only occurred as a "sister" of T(ense) in the 
AUX node, a place where infinitives could not occur; similarly, the other 
changes in the medals are a necessary result of the nature of this new 
phrase structure rule. 
In another. work (1979b), Lightfoot proposes yet another instance of 
an automatic syntactic change, this time in the English passive, and this 
time the result of the addition to the grammar of a-single 
transformational rule of NP Preposing. This rule led to the existence of 
a transformational rule of Passive whereas prior to the 16th -century, 
Lightfoot claims, English had only a lexical passive rule. He is 
assuming a theory with a rigid distinction between lexical and 
transformational (or syntactic) rules, and argues that the properties of 
a syntactic rule as opposed to a lexical rule of Passive led to at least 
.three automatic and simultaneous changes in English passives; in 
particular, three new passive sentence-patterns, listed below in (4), 
become possible: 
4. 	 a. passives with underlying indirect objects promoted (e.g. 
John was given a book) 
b. "prepositional" passives (e.g. The terms were agreed upon) 
c. 	passives with NP-subjects that do not bear a semantic 
relation to the main verb (e.g. John was expected to win). 
These changes would have occurred automatically, Lightfoot claims, 
because the new transformational (syntactic) rule of Passive could move 
any NP after the verb to subject position, whereas, according to-the 
properties of lexical rules the theory specifies, the lexical rule could 
only relate an active direct object with a passive subject. The sentence 
patterns illustrated in (4), then, could only arise with the advent of a 
transformational rule of Passive, so that these patterns are an automatic 
consequence, in Lightfoot's account, of the addition of such a rule to 
the grammar of English. 
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Despite these neat-looking examples of (virtually) simultaneous and 
automatic syntactic changes, Lightfoot's analyses are not uncontroversial 
and do not provide unqualified·examples of this type of syntactic 
change. In particular, in each instance, one has to wonder whether 
Lightfoot has correctly identified cause and effect, i.e. is it really 
the case for the modals that the disappearance of the infinitival and 
gerund forms was the result of a base restructuring, or is it not 
possible that these forms were lost and only then was the grammar 
restructured to have a modal category to accomodate these now anomalous 
verbs? Furthermore, since other verbs do not have a full set of 
nonfinite forms--for some speakers, it seems that the verb stride does 
not have a past participle, with neither has strode, has st~ has 
stridden, has strided, nor has stridded sounding acceptableb--the rnodals 
may just be a special case of the loss of nonfinite forms being 
generalized throughout a semantic class such as that formed by the modals. 
Finally, exception can be taken to some aspects of Lightfoot's 
data. For example, regarding the modals, Lightfoot takes as significant 
the fact that the Oxford English Dictionary gives the last example of a 
modal infinitival or gerund form as occurring in the 16th century, even 
though the mere occurrence of a form in a text does not guarantee that it 
is still in current use (some texts are consciously archaizing, for 
example). Moreover, the process by which the verbs that ended up as the 
Modern English modals became specialized in their modal function and 
syntax was actually a very gradual change--for example, the gerund forms 
were rather rare at all prior stages of English6--and does not really 
display the suddenness that Lightfoot suggests. Thus, until the crucial 
examples that Lightfoot·cites in support of his claims of simultaneity 
for these changes in question are subjected to careful philological 
scrutiny, his analysis has to remain tentative. 
Moreover, Lieber (1979) has suggested that the factual basis for 
Lightfoot's claims about changes in English passive sentence patterns is 
faulty, for she finds in Old English passive sentences of the type 
Lightfoot says first appeared only in the 16th century. She concludes 
that Old English had a transformational (syntactic) rule of passive, as 
well as a lexical rule, and that the changes that in Lightfoot's account 
were simultaneous and automatic consequences of the addition of a rule of 
NP Preposing were features of Passive that were already present in the 
language. Such a finding, of course, if valid, renders this example of 
automatic syntactic change nothing more than a mirage. 7 
Besides these putative automatic, simultaneous changes due to 
restructuring or rule addition, there are also examples in the literature 
which invoke language universals, and claim that a change Dx 
automatically triggers another change Dy because Dx brings on a situation 
in which some universal is "activated", so to. speak, and satisfying that 
universal requires the further change Dy· In such an instance, Dy is an 
automatic consequence of Dx and by the definitions adopted earlier, is 
simultaneous (or virtually so) with Dx· This type of explanation is 
evident in most of the· work done recently on word-·order change; in which 
putative universal correlations as in (5) have been called upon to 
explain, for example, a shift from post~ositions to prepositions in Greek 
along with a shift in basic word order: 
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5. 	 OV with Postpositions/ VO with.Prepositions . 
. Another example involving universals is one described in Joseph 
(1978, 1980) concerning what happened to Greek Object Raising and Object 
Deletion sentences, i.e. constructions analogous to the English sentences 
in (6):9 
6. 	a. Object Raising: John is easy to please. 
b. 	 Object Deletion: Mary is pretty to look at. 
when affected by the Greek replacement of infinitives by finite verbs.ID 
In Greek, from Ancient Greek up to early Medieval Greek, there were 
Object Raising and Object Deletion sentences with a form entirely 
analogous to that found in English, with an infinitive in the complement 
clause and a zero-object (i.e. a missing object argument) with that 
infinitive on the surface.11 Examples for pre-Modern Greek of Object 
Raising are given in (7) and of Object Deletion in (8), with a 0 
marking the missing object argument:12 
7. a. he: ergasia mathein 0 .•. hraiste: edokei·einai 
the-work/FEM.NOM 	 learn/INF easiest/FEM.NOM seemed be/INF 
'The w9rk seemed to be easiest to learn' (Xen. Oec. 6.9) 
b. tragoudousin to paranomon horo:sai .0 muste:rion 
sing/3PL the-illegal/NTH see/INF rite/NTR 
'They 	sing of the rite (which is) illegal 
to see' (Spanos 26 (12th century)) 
8. a. kai horan 0 stugnos e:n (Xen. Anab. 2.6.9) 
and 	 see/INF gloomy/NOM was/3SG  
'And he was gloomy to look at'  
b. 	 tous ... khrusinous hetoimous ekhei tou dounai 0 
the-gold-pieces/ACC ready/ACC.PL has/3SG PRT give/INF 
'He has 	the gold pieces ready to give 
· over' (Doukas 1164A, 13-14 (15th century)). 
When the infinitive was replaced by a finite (i.e. person-marked and 
tensed) verb in late Medieval Greek, sentences corresponding to (7) and 
(8) continue in the language, but in a slightly.different form; in 
particular, the late Medieval and Modern Greek continuation of the 
earlier Greek constructions now have a pronominal object in the 
complement clause that corresponds to the matrix subject. This is shown 
by the Modern Greek-sentences in (9), where ta in (9a) and tin in (9b) 
are obligatory object pronouns in the complement clause:13 
9. 	 a. ta anglikai ine diskola na  
the-English/NTH.PL are difficult/NTH.PL PRT  
tai katalavo  
them/NTH.PL understand/1SG  
'English is difficult for me to understand' (literally: 
"The English are difficult that I understand them") 
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b. 	 i mariai ine omorfi na tini kitazis 
Mary/NOM is pretty/NOM.FEM PRT her/ACC look-at/2SG 
'Mary 	is pretty to look at' (literally: "Mary is pretty, 
that you look at her"). 
The change from a zero-object in the complement clause to an obligatory 
object pronoun can be taken as an automatic consequence of the change in 
the infinitive, i.e. in the nature of the complement clause verb itself, 
because of a putative universal constraint on Object·Raising and Object 
Deletion constructions given in (10):14 
10. 	 Object Raising and Object Deletion cannot deprive a finite 
complement verb of its object. 
This constraint is observed in several languages, including French, 
Spanish, German·, Albanian, Irish, Korean, Mongolian, and Arabic (see 
Joseph (1978, 1980) for some discussion) and can account for the 
contrasts in (11) between unacceptable English Object Raising/Object 
Deletion sentences with finite complements versus acceptable ones with 
nonfinite complements: 
11. 	a. *John would be difficult for me to imagine (that) I might 
invite~ to my·party 
b. 	 John would be difficult for me to imagine inviting~ to 
my party 
c. 	*Melina is too ugly for us to be able to convince John that 
he should kiss~ 
d. 	 Melina is too ugly for us to be able to convince John to 
kiss~. 
If this universal is valid, the change in the possibility of a 
zero-object as opposed to a pronominal object occurring in the complement 
clause of Object Raising and Object Deletion sentences would have been a 
necessary change, given the change in the type of complementation from 
nonfinite to finite. 
A problem, though, with this account, and for that matter with any 
account making use of a universal, is that all universals are putative at 
best, subject to verification again and again as new data is brought to 
light, but therefore liable to be counter-exemplified by some piece of 
data not previously considered. For example, the potential Object 
Raising/Object Deletion universal given in (10) runs into some weak but 
nonetheless real counterexamples in English sentences such as (12): 
12. 	a. ?A book like that is tough to claim that you've read~ 
carefully. 
b. ?This rock is too heavy to claim that I can pick up~-
While not fully acceptable sentences, nonetheless, those in (12) are not 
as bad as (1) predicts. Thus this universal has some validity, for the 
sentences in (12) are not wholly well-formed, but it cannot be an 
absolute universal. As a result, in a Medieval Greek Object Raising or 
Object Deletion sentence with a finite complement and a missing object 
with that finite verb, there would not have been any necessity for an 
object pronoun to arise, even if this might have been a likely or even 
- 35 
preferred development. 
Similarly, many of the word order universals are of a statistical 
nature only, and meet with counterexamples (e.g. Pap_ago and Persian 
appear to be exceptions to the correlations noted in (5)).15 That being 
the case, one change would not necessarily force a second word-order 
change, at least as far as the correlation in (5) predicts.16 
This cursory review of prior attempts to establish instances of 
automatic syntactic change shows that in order to get a good, i.e. 
relatively safe and unass~ilable, example of such a change, one needs 
cases in which either the data is clear or, if a universal is involved, 
it is one that is not controversial and can be supported by a wide range 
of relevant data. At this point, it is appropriate to examine two 
changes from the history of Greek which meet these requirements in order 
to demonstrate riot only that automatic syntactic changes exist but also 
that they can be used in-arguing for particular theoretical frameworks. 
2. Copy-Raising in Greek 
The two changes to be examined both involve and depend on a 
construction which can be referred _to as "Copy-Raising". In order, then, 
to understand these changes properly, some background on this 
construction is needed. The Copy-Raising construction is one in which a 
nominal originating in--i.e. semanticallY linked (in initial structure) 
to--a complement clause appears-superficially in a higher clause but 
shows an overt marker--in the form of a "copy" pronoun--of. its presence 
in its "point of origin" (i.e. the lower clause). English sentences with 
the matrix predicate look like, as in (13a), have often been cited as 
examples of such a construction (the non-Raised version is given in 
(13b)): 
13. a. 	Billi looks like hei is ready to leave. 
b. It looks like Bill is ready to leave. 
(13a), 	under such an analysis, would show a nominal (Bill) raised to 
subject status in the matrix clause with.a copy (hei) left in the 
complement clause. 
This Copy-Raising construction is found in Class_ical and 
Hellenistic Greek, and has been studied in this context by Marlett 1976. 
Some examples are given in (14): 
14. 	 a. te:n ... huperbole:n to:n oreo:n ededoikesan 
the-pass/ACC the-mountains/GEN feared/3PL 
me: prokatale:phtheie (Xen. Anab. 3.5.18) 
lest be-occucpied/3SG 
'They were afraid that the mountain pass might be 
occupied' (literally: "They feared· the mountain pass 
lest it be occupied") 
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b. 	 epegino:skon de auton hoti houtos e:n 
knew/3PL and him/ACC COMP this/NOM,MASC was/3SG 
·ho kathe: menos (Acts 3:10) 
the-sitting/NOM.MASC.PPL 
'And 	they recognized that he was the one sitting' (lit.: 
"They recognized him that he was the sitting one") 
c. 	egno:n se hoti skle:ros anthro:pos ei 
knew/1SG you/ACC COMP hard/NOM.SG man/NOM.SG are/2SG 
'I knew that you were a hard man' (literally: "I knew 
you that you were a hard man") (Matt. 25: 24) 
Note that the copy is not always overtly present; because Greek has 
always been a language that suppresses unemphatic subject pronouns, a 
copy pronoun having subject status--as in (14a) and (14c)--does not have 
to appear on the surface. Marlett's analysis of these sentences as 
involving a Greek version of Copy-Raising, though admittedly not 
supported by hard evidence--such as demonstrably ungrammatical sentences 
and native speaker judgments--that is necessarily lacking for a "corpus 
language" such as Ancient or Hellenistic Greek, nonetheless can be 
adopted for two reasons. First, apparently synonymous non-Raising 
versions of such sentences can be shown to occur, and second, the logical 
structure of the predicates involved seems to point to a raising analysis 
(e.g. FEAR is a two-place predicate so that a sentence such as (14a) with 
a subject, a direct object, and a complement clause must not represent a 
basic structure with this verb). 
Modern Greek also h~s a Copy Raising construction. Although it is 
not all that common a construction and is restricted to just a handful of 
verbs, nonetheless it is a construction-type in. the language and so must 
be part of any descriptively adequate grammar that might be constructed · 
for the language,17 An example of this construction is given in (15): 
15. 	 9eoro tin maria pos mono afti ine eksipni 
consider/1SG Mary/ACC COMP only she/NOM is/3SG smart/NOM.FEM 
'I 	consider only Mary to be smart' (literally: "I consider 
Mary that only she is smart") 
and it can be contrasted with a synonymous non-Raised version as in (16): 
16. 	 9eoro pos mono i maria ine eksipni  
consider/1SG COMP only Mary/NOM is/3SG smart/FEM  
'I 	consider only Mary to be smart' (literally: "I consider 
that only Mary is smart"). 
For Modern Greek Copy Raising sentences, the usual range of arguments 
based on selectional restrictions, idiom chunks, active/passive synonymy, 
Reflexivization, and Passivization are all available to show that the 
accusative noun phrase in such sentences corresponding to tin maria in 
(15) is in fact a main clause direct object on the surface and moreover 
corresponds to an initial-structure complement clause subject,18 Most 
commonly in Modern Greek, as in earlier stages of the language, these 
Copy Raising sentences have no overt copy pronoun in the complement 
clause, for unemphatic subject pronouns generally do not appear on the 
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surface in Modern Greek; the occurrence of !!!Q.!!Q 'only' in (15) provides 
the emphasis necessary for the occurrence of the pronominal copy afti, 
With these preliminaries concerning the nature of the Copy Raising 
construction out of the way, a description and account of the changes in 
this construction between (early) Post-Classical Greek and Modern Greek 
can be developed. The ·first change concerns a change in the form, 
specifically the person, of the complement clause copy pronoun in one 
subclass of Copy Raising sentences. 
3. The Change in Complement Clause Agreement 
In Copy Raising sentences in earHer stages of Greek, the raised 
nomin·a1 and the copy always were of the same grammatical person, as shown 
by the examples given earlier; for example, in (14b), both auton, the 
raised nominal, ·and houtos, the copy pronoun, are third person, 
Moreover, in se.ntences in which the raised nominal was coreferent with 
the matrix clause and therefore of the same person as the matrix subject, 
it appeared on the surface as the reflexive pronominal form; in such a 
sentence, then, the complement-clause copy likewise was of the same 
person as the matrix clause subject (and object). An example of such a 
Copy Raising .9!!!! Reflexivization sentence is given in (17), where the 
main clause subject--understood to be the second person plural form 
humeis (absent on the surface because It is unemphatic in this 
sentence)--the reflexive form heautous and the raising copy humin are all 
second person forms: 
17. 	 auk epigino:skete heautous hoti ie:sous  
not know/2PL yourselves/Ace COMP Jesus/NOM  
khristos · en humin (2Cor. · 13: 5) 
Christ/NOM in you/DAT.PL 
'Do you not understand that Jesus Christ is within you?' 
(literally: "Do you not understand yourselves that 
Jesus Christ (is) within you?") 
In Modern Greek Copy Raising sentences with Reflexiviation in the 
matrix clause, though, a difference from the earlier pattern exemplified 
in (17) is evident. In particular, the raised nominal (the reflexive 
form) and the complement clause copy still agree in person (as in (14) 
and in (17)), but they are both different in person from the matrix 
subject. Such a sentence is given· in (18), where the matrix clause 
subject is first person (suppressed as unemphatic, but understood to be 
~ 'I/NOM'), while the reflexive form (ton eafton mu) is third person 
and the raising copy (aftos--in parentheses since it is overt only if 
emphatic)'is also third person: 
18. 	 den ea afiso ton eafto mu na petixi (aftos) 
not FUT let/1SG the-self/ACC my PRT succeed/3SG he/NOM 
'I won't let myself succeed' (literally: "I won't let the 
self of me that he succeed"). 
Even though, as noted above, the raising copy can be absent on the 
surface if, as is most usually the case, it is unemphatic, the third 
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person verb agreement in the complement clause gives an indication of 
what person its subject is understood to be, and shows that it is 
different from that found in the matrix clause (as shown by the matrix 
clause first person agreement). There is thus a syntactic difference in 
Copy Raising sentences between Hellenistic Greek and Modern Greek in the 
person of·the raising copy (and thus in the verb agreement in the 
complement clause·when the copy is the subject) when the raised nominal 
is subject to Reflexivization in the main clause. It is this syntactic 
difference which demands an explanation. 
One fact which is relevant for an explanation of this change is 
that the reflexive form itself has a different character in Modern Greek 
from that found in earlier stages of the language. In part.icular, in 
Ancient Greek and Hellenistic Greek, the reflexive was a pronominal form, 
agreeing in person with its antecedent and showing different forms for 
the different 'persons; a portion (accusative case only)' of the paradigm 
for the Ancient Greek reflexive pronoun is given in (19): 
19. 	 1SG emauton (MASC) emaute:n (FEM) 
2SG seauton seaute:n 
3SG heauton heaute:n heauto (NTH) 
lPL he:mas autous he:mas autas 
2PL humas autous humas autas 
3PL heautous heautas heauta (NTR) 
and the Hellenistic paradigm was similar.19 In Modern Greek, though, the 
reflexive is itself a fixed form, consisting of ton eafto, literally "the 
self", with a possessive pronoun; it thus has the form of a possessed 
nominal, 20 being literally "the self" with a possessive pronoun and thus 
structurally parallel to ton adelfo 'brother' with a possessive 
pronoun. The reflexive form, therefore, is syntactically a third person 
nominal, just as is any nonpronominal noun phrase, The possessive 
pronoun is the only thing in the reflexive form that necessari1y21 shows 
agreement with the reflexive antecedent, A partial (accusative only) 
paradigm of the reflexive form is given in (20), along with the possessed 
form of 'brother' for comparison: 
20. 	 1SG ton eafto mu IPL ton eafto mas  
2SG ton eafto su 2PL ton eafto sas  
3SG ton eafto tu (M/N) 3PL ton eafto tus (M/N/F)  
ton 	eafto tis (F) 
cf. 	 ton adelfo mu/su/tu/tis/mas/sas/tus 
'my/your/his, its/her/our/your/their brother'. 
This 	change in the form of the reflexive took place at least as early as 
the 12th century; an example from the poems of Glykas is given in (21): 
21. 	 na pnikso: ton heauton mou (Glykas 288 (12th cent.)) 
FUT drown/1SG the-self/AOC my 
'I will drown myself'. 
There has thus actually been a multiple change in the form of 
Raising cum Reflexive sentences between earlier stages of Greek and 
Modern Greek. The re_flexive form and the copy found in Raising cum 
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Reflexive sentences have both changed so as to differ from the matrix 
subject (the reflexive antecedent) in person. It seems, therefore, that 
two (virtually) simultaneous changes have occurred, and moreover, it can 
be shown that this set of changes provides an excellent candidate for 
consideration as an automatic syntactic change. In particular, it seems 
that the change in the form of the complement clause copy pronoun in such 
raising sentences is an automatic consequence of the change in the form 
of the reflexive. 
The motivation behind the necessary change of the copy to third 
person along with the change of the reflexive to third person status is 
the following universal: 
22. 	 A copy must agree in all relevant features (i.e. relevant to 
the language in question, e.g. person and number) with the 
nominal of which it is a copy. 
It is safe to say that most linguists would agree that (22) is a fairly 
uncontroversial universal, one for which it would be very hard to find 
counterexamples. For instance, one class of apparent counterexamples,· 
namely sentences such as (23): 
23. 	 John, I can't stand the idiot 
is probably best analyzed as involving dangling topics rather than a 
nonagreeing copy. Furthermore, the need for such a universal independent 
of the Greek Raising cum Reflexive sentences under consideration is shown 
by copy/antecedent agreement in a variety of constructions in a variety 
of languages, including English look-copy sentences (cf. (13) above) and 
Left-Dislocation sentences, as in (24): 
24. a. The scissorsi look like theyi/*it need to be sharpened. 
b. John, I can't stand him/*her/*it. 
If this universal is valid, then a ready explanatin is provided for 
the apparent automatic nature of the syntactic change in question here. 
When the reflexive changed in person, the universal would guarantee that 
the copy pronoun in the complement clause--inasmuch as it is .a copy of 
the nominal that surfaces as the reflexive--would also change. 
The only potential problem with this account--and thus with taking 
this change as a true instance of an automatic syntactic change triggered 
by a universal--is the fact that it cannot be conclusively demonstrated 
that the change in the complement clause copy was simultaneous with the 
change jn the reflexive. Unfortunately, as is so often the case in such 
investigations, there is not very much historical data to back up the 
claim. However, in this instance, there is at least some. The reflexive 
change, as noted above (cf. (21)), took place no later than the 12th 
century. The first Raising cum Reflexive sentence, though, that occurs 
in Greek after the reflexive change dates from the late 16th century, 
from the Cretan comedy Katzourmbos,: 
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25. 	 thelo: aphe:sei ton emauto mou na ...  
want/lSG let/INF the·-self/ACC my PRT  
ksale:smone:se: (ton nou mou) (Katz. II. 173-4) 
forget/3SG the-mind/ACC my 
'I won't let·myself forget my mind'. 
In interpreting this sentence as a relevant example for the discussion 
here, it is necessary to take the third person singular verb agreement 
exhibited by the complement verb ksale:smone:se: as indicating that the 
complement clause subject--absent on the surface because of unemphatic 
subject pronoun drop in Greek-·-was third person. What makes this 
sentence valuable, despite the four centuries between it and the 
reflexive change is the fact that no.counterexamples, at least, with 
agreement patterns different from those in (25), are to be found. 
Sentences such as these, by their very nature, might well be expected to 
be quite rare, 22 so· that despite the scarcity of conclusive historical 
data, there is really nothing standing in the way of taking (25) and its 
kind to represent a change that occurred concomitantly with the changes 
in the reflexive evidenced in (21). This consideration and the 
strong--and generally unassailable--universal in (22) that has been 
proposed to be at work in the change combine to make this a very good 
candidate for a real example of an automatic syntactic change. 
4. 	 Sneaky Passives Oiachronically 
Another aspect of the Copy Raising construction provides another 
instance of a syntactic change which, though lacking in some of the 
crucial historical data, nonetheless seems to be a real instance of an 
automatic syntactic change. In this case, however, there are some 
interesting theoretical dividends concerning differences between 
derivational versus nonderivational frameworks that can be reaped from 
the account of the change. 
This change concerns the status of Copy Raising sentences in which 
the complement clause is passive and the raised nominal corresponds to 
the agentive noun phrase in the complement clause. An example of such a 
sentence from Ancient Greek is given in (26): 
26. 	 dedoik' emauton ... me: poll' agan  
fear/lSG myself/ACC not much/NOM.PL.NTR too  
eire:mena e: moi (Oed. Tyr. 767) 
said/PASS.PPL.NOM.PL.NTR be/3SG me/DAT 
'I fear that. too much has been said by me' . 
Such sentences can be referred to as "Sneaky Passives", following 
Perlmutter & -Soames (1979: 164ff.). because in a derivational framework, 
these can be derived by applying Copy Raising in the matrix clause and 
then applying Passive "sneakily" into the complement. clause; this latter 
step is possible because Copy Raising leaves a fully-intact complement 
clause, complete with subject (the copy pronoun) and object, and thus 
meeting the structural requirements for application of a passive rule. 
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This derivation is sketched in (27): 
27. UNDERLYING STRUCTURE: s[I fear s[I say too muchJs ls 
COPY RAISING: [I fear myself [I say too much)) 
(+ REFLEXIVE) 
PASSIVE ("SNEAKILY"): [I fear myself [too much be said by me)] 
where many details of structure have deliberately been left out. 
Sneaky Passives were fully grammatical in earlier stages of Greek, 
as (26) indicates. It is important to note that Copy Raising could in 
general operate on oblique nominals, as shown by examples (17) above and 
(28) below: 
28. a. phoboumai hwnas me: eike: kekopiaka eis humas 
fear/lSG 	 you/ACC.PL not in-vain worked/lSG among you/ACC.PL 
'I fear that in vain have I spent my labor among you' 
(literally: "I fear you lest I have spent my labor 
among you in vain") (Gal. 4: 11) 
b. 	kai poiei pantasi ... hina do:sin autoisi kharagma 
and cause/3SG all/ACC.PL COMP give/3PL them/DAT mark/ACC 
'And 	he caused everyone .•. to receive a mark' 
(literally: "He caused ·everyonei that theyj give to 
themi a mark") (Rev. 13:16) 
The fact that oblique nominals were eligible for Copy Raising means that 
a "Sneaky Passive" sentence such as (26) actually has two possible 
derivations. Besides the one outlined in (27), there is also a 
derivation in which passive applies in the complement clause followed by 
Copy Raising of the agent nominal created by passive into the higher 
clause. It is significant that (28b) shows Copy Raising of a·dative noun 
phrase (autois), since it shows that even if the eligibility conditions 
for Copy Raising were stated in terms of case-marking, such a derivation 
for (26)--where the nominal corresponding to the raised noun phrase in 
the complement clause is a dative, moi--cannot be ruled out. It can be 
concluded, then, that a sentence su;;i;-as (26) indeed has two possible 
derivations--the "Sneaky" Passive derivation and the one in which first 
Passive applies in the lower clause· and then Copy Raising in the higher 
clause. 
Sometime between Ancient Greek and Modern Greek, and unfortunately 
there is absolutely no textual evidence to indicate when this may have 
occurred, a change took place in Copy Raising. Whereas in Ancient Greek, 
it seems that any nominal could be raised to object status in a higher 
clause (cf. the raising of obliques in (28)), in Modern Greek Copy 
Raising is restricted to operating only on subjects. 23 Thus, sentences 
such as (29) are ungrammatical: 
29. 	 *0eoro ton yani pos ton vrika ili0io 
consider/lSG John/ACC COMP him/ACC found/lSG stupid/ACC 
'I consider John that I found him (to be) stup.id'. 
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Since there is no indication regarding the status of such sentences in 
Medjeval Greek, the assumption can be made that the Modern Greek evidence 
shows that the change in which nominals can be raised via Copy Raising 
has taken place within the Modern Greek period, i.e. in what is roughly 
the contemporary language. 
What is interesting here is that besides this change in the 
eligibility of nominals for Copy Raising, there is another change, namely 
a change in the status of Sneaky Passive sentences. In Modern Greek, 
Sneaky Passive sentences are ungrammatical, as shown by (30): 
30. 	 *0eoro ton yani pos i maria vlaftjke apo aft.on 
consider/lSG John/ACC COMP Mary/NOM hurt/3SG.PASS by him/ACC 
'*I consider John that Mary was hurt by him'. 
Thus it appears that this is another instance of a simultaneous change--a 
change in what can raise occurs together with a change in the status of 
Sneaky Passives. Although the mere apparent (or stipulated) simultaneity 
of the two changes does not mean that one is an automatic consequence of 
the other, as noted above in section 1, it is desirable to treat them as 
having that relationship, for then one change can be explained in terms 
of the other. Thus, fol.lowing that line of reasoning, an account is 
developed below in which the change in Sneaky Passives is an automatic 
consequence of the change in the Copy Raising construction; any such 
account necessarily is stronger--and thus more interesting and 
preferable--to one in which the changes are unrelated (again, as noted in 
section 1). 
In a nonderivational framework, as pointed out in ~ection 1, there 
are no syntactic rules that work to convert a deep structure into a 
surface structure vja a serles of phrase-markers (or the equivalent).· 
Instead, sentences are generated in their surface forms in accordance 
with the analogue of syntactic (transformational) rules, namely 
well-formedness conditions on these surface strings. The analogue of 
Subject-to-Object Raising, for instance, would be a well-formedness 
condition sanctioning the occurrence of a nominal that is semantically 
"relevant" (to use as theory-..neutral a term as possible) only in a lower 
clause (i.e. it bears a logical relation only in that clause) as an 
object in a higher clause. Put in terms of a nonderivational framework 
with a recognition of syntactic levels and grammatical relations, such as 
Arc Pair Granunar or Relational Grammar, such a condition would allow an 
initial level complement clause nominal, e.g. a subject, to occur as a 
final level matrix clause object. 
In such a framework, Ancient Greek Copy Raising would be a 
well-formedness condition such that a nominal bearing any final .level 
grammatical relation in the complement clause may "legally" be the matrix 
clause object. This condition is stated in s]jghtly more formal terms ln 
(31): 
31. Condition on Ancient Greek Copy Raising: 
The final complement GR,.: (= any grammatical relation) 
is the final matrix clause GR2 (= direct object). 
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In other words, (31) allows the occurrence of Copy Raising sentences in 
which the final matrix object bears any final level grammatical relation 
in the complement clause, 
A condition such as this sanctions Sneaky Passives such as (26), 
repeated here for convenience: 
26. 	 dedoik' emauton ... me: poll' agan  
fear/lSG myself/ACC not much/NOM.PL.NTR too  
eire:mena e: moi (Oed. Tyr. 767) 
said/PASS.PPL.NOM,PL.NTR be/3SG me/DAT 
'I fear that too much has been said by me'. 
because the matrix object emauton--which does not bear a logical relation 
to the matrix verb--bears. some final grammatical relation in the 
complement clause, namely the relation of the agent in a passive clause 
(the "ChOmeur" relation of Relational Grammar, the a-relation of Postal's 
Arc Pair Grammar). The well-fonnedness condition states only that this 
nominal must bear some relation in the lower clause; it does not restrict 
which relation this might be, so that passive agent meets the 
requirements of the condition. 
In Modern Greek, though, the well-fonnedness condition for Copy 
Raising sentences has changed so that instead of being able to be any 
complement clause grammatical relation, the matrix object can only be the 
final complement clause subject (as noted earlier--recall example (29)). 
The Modern Greek version of this condition is given in (32): 
32. Condition on Modern Greek Copy Raising: 
The final complement GR1 (= subject) is the final matrix 
clause GR2 (= direct object). 
This differs from (31) just in the specification of GR1 as opposed to 
GRx, that is, a relatively minor change from a fonnal standpoint. 
However, it is a change that has important consequences. In particular, 
(32) automatically rules out Sneaky Passives because in Sneaky Passives, 
the matrix object in a Copy Raising is not the final complement clause 
subject, but rather is the final passive agent (i.e. chomeur or 
a-relation). 
There are admittedly a few potential problems with this account. 
In particular, since in Greek Raising there is a copy of the raised 
nominal in.the lower clause, is it the copy or the matrix object that is 
considered to bear the relevant grammatical relation in the lower 
clause? It may be necessary to stipulate something to the effect that a 
copy counts the same as the form of which it is a copy in terms of 
satisfying the well-fonnedness conditions and the "is" relationship 
utilized in the Raising well-fonnedness conditions (i.e. in (31) and 
(32)). Alternatively, the existence of a chain of "control" linking the 
matrix object with its copy in the lower clause may be sufficient. This 
particular problem, however, is not a problem just for Copy Raising but 
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rather is a general problem of determining how the overall syntactic 
framework should.treat copies of nominals that bear particular 
grammatical relations. 
Still, in this framework, the problem posed by the apparent 
simultaneity of these two changes--the change in what can raise and the 
change in the status of Sneaky Passives---finds a straightforward 
solution, for the change from (31) to (32) automatically triggers the 
change in the acceptability of Sneaky Passives. · The ease with which the 
nonderivational framework can account for these two changes is striking, 
for it contrasts with the extra machinery and extra assumptions needed in 
a derivational account of the changes. 
For convenience in exposition, a derivational framework is assumed 
here in which rules are stated in terms of grammatical relations; this 
decision allows for easier comparison with the nondeirvational account 
outlined above, {or rules in that account are so stated. The main 
assumption behind a derivational approach is that syntactic rules convert 
an initial structure into a surface structure through a series of 
sequentially-ordered steps (phrase markers, in the terminology of 
transformational grarnrnrnar). Raising, therefore, in such a framework is a 
"process" by which a nominal in a lower clause becomes the object .in a 
higher clause. For the sentence-type under consideration, i.e. sentences 
parallel in structure to (26), it has been established (see above, 
earlier in this section) that two derivations--two sets of sequentially 
applied syntactic rules--are possible: first Passive in the lower clause 
followed by Raising in the higher clause but also the "Sneaky" Passive 
derjvation with first Raising in the higher clause and then Passive 
applying "sneakily" in the lower clause left intact by Copy Raising. 
It is well-known that the assumption of sequentially-ordered rules 
in syntax has led to the recognition of the need for the cyclic 
application of syntactic rules. That is to say, natural languages 
exhibit syntactic phenomena, well-discussed in the literature, 2ij which 
require recourse to a device such as cyclic rule application in order to 
be accounted.for in a derivational framework. In cyclic rule 
application, syntactic rules apply as a block sentence by sentence from 
the most deeply embedded clause in the phrase marker to the topmost 
(matrix) clause. In a derivational framework, therefore, the cycle has 
been posited as a linguistic universal. - · 
Similarly, along with the cycle, it turns out that there are 
phenomena in natural languages which require the imposition of a 
constraint---the Strict Cyclicity constraint--which prevents a rule from 
applying (or reapplying, as the case may be) into an already cycled-on 
domain. With such a constraint, once a higher clause has been reached in 
the cyclic application of rules, a lower clause--an already cycled-on 
domain--would not be a possible domain for a r·ule. With Strict 
Cyclicity, rules cannot "reach down", so to speak, so as to apply 
entirely within a cyclic domain that has already been passed. As with 
the cycle itself, the Strict Cyclicity condition has been proposed as a 
linguistic universal. 
However, in at least some versions of derivational frameworks, 
there are rules which can be called noncyclic or post.cyclic, i.e. they 
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are not "in" the cycle, These rules, moreover, can apply freely into 
already cycled-on embedded clauses. An example of such a rule would be 
Relativization or Question .Movement;25 thus a question word which 
originates in an embedded clause nonetheless can be fronted when the 
matrix clause is reached after the cycle, as in (23), where the~ 
indicates the deep structure point of origination of the question word: 
33. Who did Sally think John felt Bill was ready to hit~? 
One interpretation of this observation is that the principle of Strict 
Cyclicity is valid only for cyclic rules, and does not hold, universally 
it would be posited, for rules not in the cycle (whether demonstrably 
post-cyclic or simply not demonstrably cyclic) rules, This is an 
interpretation which becomes crucial later on in the discussion, 
Thus, a d~rivational framework has derivations, it has the cycle, 
and it has a principle of Strict Cyclicity that is restricted to cyclic 
rules. Given these elements of the framework, the change in Greek Copy 
Raising would automatically trigger a change in the status of Sneaky 
Passives. For Ancient Greek, the framework just outlined would allow 
only the derivation of Raising£!!!!! Passive sentences such as (26) only 
via the derivation in which Passive applied in the lower clause and then 
Raising applied in the higher clause to raise the now passive agent to 
object status (recall that in Ancient Greek, Raising could operate on 
nonsubject nominals). The other possible derivation--the "Sneaky" 
Passive derivation by which first Raising applied in the higher clause 
and then Passive "snuck" down into the lower clause to apply and put the 
original subject into an agentive phrase--would be ruled out becuse it 
would violate the principle of Strict Cyclicity (by reaching down into an 
already cycled-on domain). 
Therefore, the change in which nominals were eligible for Raising 
(see (31) and (32) above) would be reflected also in a change in the 
status of Sneaky Passive sentences such as (30), because the only way 
(30) could be derived in this framework is by Raising an oblique 
(agentive) nominal (the other derivation being ruled out by Strict 
Cyclicity). A restriction on what can raise--from any nominal to only 
subjects--therefore automatically leads to a situation in which the only 
possible derivation for a sentence is systematically ruled out. Such a 
sentence is thus ungrammatical, for it cannot be derived. 
At this point, from a comparison of the derivational account just 
presented and the nonderivational account preceding it, it would appear 
that the two accounts are equivalent. In both accounts, the change in 
Sneaky Passives falls out as an automatic consequence of the change in 
Copy Raising acting in concert with certain aspects of each framework 
that are either built-in or are universal parts of the theory in question 
(as the cycle is in a derivational framework). 
However, on closer inspection, it turns out that there is a crucial 
difference between the two accounts. In particular, the derivational 
account must make one further, unwarranted and thus unmotivated 
assumption. 
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It came out earlier in the discussion that under certain 
interpretations of the way in which rules such as Question Movement 
operate, the principle of Strict Cyclicity would have to be valid only 
for cyclic rules. The consequence of such a restriction of this 
principle, however, is that only as long as Passive is a cyclic rule will 
it be constrained by Strict Cyclicity so as not to apply "sneakily" into 
an already cycled-on domain. That means that the derivational account 
must make the additional assumption that the rule of Passive stayed as a 
cyclic rule between Ancient Greek and Modern Greek, i.e. that it 
maintained its "cycle-type" and did not become noncyclic. This is a 
result which could be guaranteed by an appropriate typology of cyclic 
rules, such that a rule with properties such as the Passive rule has 
would necessarily be a cyclic rule, but in the absence of such a 
typology, 26 it would constitute an extra assumption necessary in a 
derivational framework. This result would mean further that the 
ungrammaticality of Sneaky Passive sentences in Modern Greek really is 
not an automatic consequence of the change in Copy Raising, for Sneaky 
Passives could have remained grammatical if Passive had changed its cycle 
type and become a noncyclic rule (and thus not subject to Strict 
Cyclicity). 
Furthermore, there is some evidence to suggest that rules can 
change their cycle type diachronically and move from being a cyclic rule 
to being noncyclic. In particular, Reflexivization (at least ·the 
so-called "Direct Reflexivization") in Ancient Greek, as best as can be 
determined, ·was probably a cyclic rule, inasmuch as it interacts with 
apparent EQUI and Raising constructions much as Reflexivization in 
English interacts with the English analogues of those constructions. 
Since that interaction in English has generally been taken as evidence 
for the cyclicity of Reflexivization in English, a similar conclusion can 
be drawn for Ancient Greek Reflexivization. 27 However, in Modern Greek, 
due in part to the change in the morphological make-up of the reflexive 
expression (see the discussion in section 3 regarding (19) and (20)), 
Reflexivization must be taken as a noncyclic rule. The crucial sentences 
that lead to this conclusion are the following; 
34. a. den Sa afiso ton eafto mu na me katastrepsi 
NEG FUT let/1SG the-self/ACC my PRT me/ACC destroy/3SG 
'I won't let myself destroy myself' (literally: "I won't 
let myself that he destroy me") 
b. *den Sa afiso ton eafto mu na katastrepsi ton eafto tu 
his 
c. *den 0a afiso ton eafto mu na katastrepsi ton eafto mu 
my. 
If Reflexivization were cyclic, then it would be expected that (34c), 
with multiple occurrences of ton eafto mu, in both the lower clause and 
the higher clause, would be grammatical. However, (34c) is 
ungrammatical, as is (34b), where there is a reflexive form in the lower 
clause but the possessive that occurs with it is third person (agreeing 
with the person of the reflexive in the higher clause). The only 
acceptable version of such a sentence with Raising and Reflexivization2B 
is that given in (34a), in which there is Raising and Reflexivization in 
the higher clause but no evidence of Reflexivization .in the lower 
clause. Such facts run counter to the predictions made by an assumption 
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of cyclicity for Reflexivization in Modern Greek, so it can be concluded 
that the rule is noncyclic in this stage of the language and that 
therefore Reflexivization has changed its cycle-type between Ancient 
Greek and Modern Greek.29 
An additional example of a change in cycle-type of a rule has been 
proposed by Haiman 1974. He argues that various phenomena connected with 
the Verb-Second constraint in Germanic languages first entered particular 
grammars as postcyclic processes, subsequently became cyclic, and in some 
cases forced a deep structure reanalysis, For instance, he points to the 
fact that many dummy pronoun insertions (e.g. the it of English 
it-Extraposition, there of there-insertion, etc.) are cyclic in modern 
Germanic languages but appear to be postcyclic in earlier stages of the 
langauges in question, A similar analysis is offered for the Verb-Second 
Constraint itself. 
These two examples,. Greek Reflexivization and the Germanic 
Verb-Second constraint, suggest that a change in cycle-type is a possible 
type of change that a rule (or grammatical constraint) can undergo in a 
derivational theory. That being the case, the change in Sneaky Passives 
can only be an automatic consequence of the change in what can undergo 
Raising if it is assumed that Passive stayed a cyclic rule in Greek (or 
if an adequate typology of cyclic rules is developed--see footnote 26); 
since there is no reason, in the absence of a suitable typology, why 
Passive should remain cyclic, it must be. concluded that the derivational 
account cannot adequately characterize a relationship between the change 
in Sneaky Passives and the change in Copy Raising. 
Thus the nonderivational account actually provides a better 
explanation of these changes in Greek than the derivational account does, 
for it does not require the additional ad hoc assumption regarding the 
maintenance of cycle-type for Passive. Consequently, the nonderivational 
account is to be preferred. These differences are summarized in (35): 
35. 	 In order for the change in Sneaky Passive to be automatically 
accounted for: 
a. a derivational account needs: 
i. 	 the cycle and a principle of Strict Cyclicity valid 
for cyclic rules (this is given by the theory) 
ii. 	 the change in the Raising rule (see (31) and (32)) 
iii. 	 the assumption that Passive maintains its cycle-type 
and is therefore subject to Strict Cyclicity 
b. a nonderivational account needs: 
i. 	 a notion of levels to which syntactic rules can make 
reference (this is given by the theory--in the 
version of nonderivational granunar assumed here) 
ii. 	 the change in the Raising rule (see (31) and (32)). 
The nonderivational account has no derivations and therefore no 
cycle; the problem of change in cycle-type is, for such a framework, 
really only a pseudo-problem, for it is one that is forced only by the 
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ground rules .of the derivational framework .. Thus this syntactic change 
in Greek makes it clear how a derivational framework is burdened by all 
sorts of extra devices and machinery, such as the cycle; as well as 
problems, such as a change in cycle-type, that are, in a real sense, 
nothing more than artifacts of these extra devices. 
By way of conclusion, a summary of the results developed here can 
be given, as well as a recognition of some remaining· problems. 
First, it should be clear that automatic syntactic changes do 
exist, even though some of the previous attempts at uncovering such 
changes are probably not as conclusive as they might appear at first to 
be. The examples involving changes in the Greek Raising construction 
seems to be fairly good cases of automatic syntactic change. 
Second, it is also clear that different theoretical frameworks 
handle the same syntactic change in different ways, demonstrating that 
the view that emerges of what changes there are in a language is to a 
large extent colored by one's view of how synchronic gr8IIDDars are to be 
characterized. It is possible, moreover, to compare the accounts that 
are provided in different frameworks. Lightfoot (1979a) has claimed that 
diachronic syntax provides "a new style of argumentation for choosing 
between competing theories and synchronic descriptions, by requiring that 
the theory interact with a theory of change to account for the point at 
which grammars undergo reanalyses or 'catastrophic' changes". The 
suggestion here is that the ability to relate simultaneous changes as 
being automatic changes is another criterion for deciding between 
competing theories to which diachronic syntax can contribute. 
Third, given such a criterion for deciding between competing 
theories, the evidence from the change in the status of Sneaky Passive 
sentences in Greek shows that a nonderivational approach to syntax is to 
be preferred over a derivational approach, for the latter provides a 
simpler and less ad hoc account of the Sneaky Passive change and of the 
means for connecting the Sneaky Passive change with the Copy Raising 
change in a manner that is both natural and automab c. 
Finally, it is only fair to mention what seems to be the only real 
problem with the discussion of these changes in Greek syntax, namely the 
lack of conclusive historical evidence. There are clear indications 
about the status of the relevant constructions in the first stage, 
Ancient Greek (i.e., in this context, Classical and New Testament Greek), 
and about the last stage, Modern Greek, but only meager indications about 
the intervening stages, especially in the case of the Sneaky Passive 
construction. Unfortunately, there is nothing that can be done about t.he 
lack of data;30 it is simply a fact of life in historical studies that 
crucial data can be missing. One might simply dismiss these otherwise 
very interesting examples for that reason or else take them at face value 
and try to grapple with them. The latter approach has been adopted here, 
for the former seems counter-productive in that it limits the extent to 
which an understanding of syntactic change can be increased. 
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Notes 
*This paper was read as an invited lecture to the Indiana 
University Linguistics Club in March of 1980. What is published here is 
essentially that version, with a few relatively minor changes in 
organization and diction, as well as updating of references, providing of 
footnotes, etc. 
1. There are of course other modes of explanation that one might 
explore, such as a functional or social motivation for the occurrence of 
one change or another. It is my belief that no one type of explanation, 
whether formal (such as is pursued here), functional, social, or 
whatever, precludes the investigation of causation from one of the other 
perspectives, i.e. there is not only a formal side to language (how it is 
represented in a speaker's individual competence), but also a functional 
side (the uses to which a speaker puts this competence), a social side, 
etc. 
2. This assumption is justified by the view in which diachrony is 
seen as the transition of a language through a succession of synchronic 
stages. Linguistic theory provides the constraints on possible 
synchronic systems, so that the movement through time is always the 
movement of one possible system into another possible system. Therefore, 
a theory of synchrony must be able to account for (at least certain· 
aspects of) diachrony as well. While it may be true that not all 
linguists would adhere to such a view, it is not an idiosyncratic one; 
Culicover (1984: 118), for example, labels such an assumption 
"reasonable". 
3. Although the issue of whether grammars are derivational or not 
is less an issue now than when this paper was first written (1980), it is 
important to note that some still-current theories are derivational in 
principle, including Government and Binding Theory (despite the 
considerable limitation on the number of rules that apply to convert deep 
structures into surface structures), while others, including Generalized 
Phrase Structure Grammar, are distinctly nonderivational. 
4. See, for example, Postal 1986, and the papers in Perlmutter 
1983 and in Perlmutter and Rosen 1984. 
5. To my ear, has stridden does not sound all that bad. As 
Jeffrey Huntsman of Indiana University has kindly pointed out to me, the 
form stridden does occur in a variety of texts and there is also the form 
bistridan in Old and Middle English; moreover, the oddity of a perfect 
tense formation with stride may be more a function of the relative 
infrequency of the base verb itself, and not a peculiarity associated 
with the past participle. 
6. I am grateful once more to Jeffrey Huntsman of Indiana 
University for reminding me of this important fact. 
7. The debate perhaps should not be closed on this point, however, 
for Russom (.1982) has shown that Lieber's examples of syntactic passives 
in Old English have been misanalyzed. T leave this matter to future 
research, inasmuch as my intent here was only to provide an example that 
-· 50 
has been given in the extant literature of a change that would be 
simultaneous ·and automatic in the sense developed here. 
8. The literature on word-order change and the relevance of 
universals is enormous, and no attempt can be made here to even briefly 
survey the field; the reader is referred to Hawkins (1979, 1980, 1982a, 
1982b, 1983), Smith 1981, Coopmans 1984, ·Rnd Payne 1985 for discussion. 
9. The exact analysis of these sentences is irrelevant to the 
point being developed here. In particular, in some theoretical 
frameworks, e.g. Government & Binding Theory, there is no "raising" at 
all in (6a) but rather WH--Movement, and in nonderivational frameworks, 
there are no raising or deletion processes at all. Moreover, in some 
accounts, both sentence -pat. terns in ( 6) ·--despite some differences they 
exhibit, for example, in the possibility of extraposition--are treated as 
involving the same type of syntactic structure. Such considerations are 
irrelevant to the matter at hand because in any theoretical framework, 
sentences such as those in (6) and the construction-type(s) they 
represent must be accounted for in some way, and the point regarding 
automatic changes in the.Greek equivalents of these patterns can thus be 
translated into the appropriate theoretical analogue. 
10. For details on the loss of the infinitive in Greek, see now 
.Joseph 1983 and references therein. 
11. There is of course also a missing subject argument as well 
with the infinitive, a fact which is less significant for the changes to 
be described here than the missing object. 
12. For further examples and discussion, see Joseph (1978, 1980, 
1983). 
13. It is import.ant to point out that the complement object was 
obligatorily missing in these constructions from Ancient Greek up through 
early Medieval Greek. Examples of these constructions from Medieval 
Greek are to be found in .Joseph (1978, 1980, 1983). 
14. I purposely state the constraint in this form, mentioning 
specific constructions, and not in some more general manner (e.g. 
utilizing the various versions of the Tensed-S Condition of Chomsky 1973) 
in part because it is irrelevant just how generally this constraint holds 
in the grammar, as long as it is valid for the constructions under 
consideration, and in part because I feel that there is sufficient reason 
not to believe that the Tensed-S condition is a valid condition (cf., for 
example, the possibility of WH-Movement out of tensed clauses--though 
such construct.ions admittedly have a different analysis in Chomsky's 
framework) . 
15. Hawkins (op. cit..), though, does attempt to address this 
problem through the use of implications involving more than two elements, 
which he claims leads to better statistical validity (e.g. SOV ---> (ADJ 
+ N --->GEN+ N)), 
16, This point. has been made most recently by Payne 1985, though 
see also Coopmans 1984. 
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17. The exact analysis of this construction has been the subject 
of considerable debate among gfinerative grammarians of Modern Greek; see, 
for example, Joseph (1976, 1978: Chapter 10, 1980), Philippaki-Warburton 
(1979, 1986), Kakouriotis 1979, Ingria 1981, inter alia. The facts under 
consideration remain the same, and the debate has been spurred in·part by 
changes that have been made in the assumptions that underlie the 
theoretical frameworks·adopted by different linguists, 
18, See the references in footnote 17, especially Joseph (1976), 
for details. Note that even in those frameworks (e.g. that of Ingria 
1981 or Philippaki-Warburton 1986) in which no raising is assumed for 
this construction, there is obligatorily a "l i.nkage" between the matrix 
accusative nominal and the complement clause subject position. Thus, the 
account to be given here of changes in this construction, an account 
which, given the framework adopted here, depends on the assumption of 
Copy-Raising, could be translated into a framework with no raising 
through the use of this obligatory linkage. 
19. Admittedly, the second person plural form in (17), heautous, 
differs from the Ancient Greek form, and shows generalization of the 
older third person plural form; however, heautous in (17) can be assumed 
to be person marked since person was still paradigmatic in the 
Hellenistic reflexive, with overt person distinctions found in the 
singular, for example. 
20. For example, the reflexive can be modified by an adjective in 
the manner that nouns are modified, with the adjective between the 
definite article and the nominal, but not in the manner that pronouns are 
modified, with the definite article and adjective after the nominal; for 
complete details and further relevant arguments, see Joseph & 
Philippaki-Warburton (1986: sections 1.6 and 2.1.2.2). 
21. Optionally, the reflexive form itself can occur as a plural if 
the antecedent is a plural noun phrase, as in : 
i. ernis kitazume tus eaftus mas 
we/NOM 	watch/lPL the-selves/ACC.PL our 
'We are looking at ourselves'. 
In such a case, the reflexive form shows agreement in number with the 
antecedent:, but this agreement does not encode person on the reflexive 
form nor is it obligatory. 
22. For example, in Modern Greek written documents (books, 
magazines, newspapers, etc.)--a much larger "corpus" than is available 
for Medieval Greek, especially Medieival Greek of the 10th to 14th 
centuries, i.e. near when the Reflexive change occurred--I have found 
only two examples of Raising cum Reflexive sentences. Native speaker 
judgments of the form that such sentences must take, however, are 
remarkably uniform, all agreeing that if raising occurs and if the 
conditions for the appearance of the reflexive form are met, the 
complement clause must have third person agreement on the verb. These 
facts have been discussed briefly in Joseph (1978: Chapter 10; 1979), 
and in some detail in Joseph & Perlmutter (1979). 
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23. There is some controversy on this point. Ingria 1981 has 
drawn attention to some sentences which appear to involve raising of 
nonsubjects. My :informants in general were most unhappy wi'th such 
sentences, hence my conclusion that Raising is restricted to subjects. 
Moreover, the·only sentences with apparent nonsubject raising that my 
informants accepted were those involving perception verbs, a class which 
has proven notoriously resistant to analysis in many languages. · Ingria 
himself, furthermore, argues that the structures in question are not 
Raising structures, a conclusion I support for the nonsubject instances 
but. not for those involving subjects. See footnote 17 for references on 
some of the con.troversy surrounding this ·construction. 
24. See, for example, the discussion ·in Perlmutter & Soames 1979. 
25. I am adopting here an analysis of.these rules in which they do 
not apply in "successive cyclic" fashion. 
26. One possibility is that rules that change grammatical 
relations are necessarily cycle (a principle to this effect was propsoed 
by Perlmutter and Postal in 1974 lectures). However, there are rules in 
English that seem to have the effect of changing grammatical relations 
that do· not however "feed" clearly cyclic rules such as (English) Passive 
and thus seem not to be in the cycle. An example is the Benefactive, --·> 
Direct Object rule which produces sentences such as I baked Mary a cake; 
for many speakers, !'1!;J!:Y cannot be pass i vi zed (i.e. *Mary was _baked a cake _ 
.~), a fact whi.ch would be accounted for if Benefactive --> Direct 
Object were a noncyclic rule. Such an analysis would mean giving up a 
typology of rule cycle-type based on effect on grammatical relations. 
27; I realize that actually proving that Ancient Greek 
Reflexivization is cyclic is an impossible task, given the unavailability 
of all of the relevant data that could be brought to bear on the matter; 
what is presented here, then, is at best a plausible account that is 
consistent with known facts. 
28. These sentences are much more acceptable if neither Raising 
nor Reflexivization occur, inasmuch as Raising is somewhat limited in 
Modern Greek and other means of expressing reflexivity (e.g. through the 
use of mediopassive verbal morphology) are not only available but 
generally preferred. Nonetheless, there is no doubt that these rules nre 
part of the grammar of Modern Greek, so that their interaction and 
application in the same "derivation" is possible in principle. Moreover, 
although somewhat unusual .in nature (note the awkwardness of the English 
translation), all Greek speakers that I have consulted with on this and 
related sentences~-some 20 in all from various parts of Greece and from a 
variety of backgrounds---have uniform judgments. 
29. This result and related conclusions on the empirical content 
of the cycle as a syntactic construct have been discussed in Joseph and 
Perlmutter 1979; I hope to make the results more readily available in a 
forthcoming monographic study of Raising in Greek. 
30. I have carried out.about as thorough a search as possible 
through the vernacular texts of Medieval Greek, covering literally 
thousands of pages of documents; see Joseph (1978: Chapter 1) for· a 
discussion of the methodology and references regarding the texts examined. 
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